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Introduction 
The Karen Quinlan case has resurfaced a discussion of the concepts 
of ordinary and extraordinary means of preserving life as they have 
been understood and developed by Catholic theologians over the 
years. In this study, I would like to outline that understanding and 
development as they appeared before this celebrated case, so that we can 
see ethical methodology at work, free from the emotion and personal 
involvement which often surrounds such a sensitive issue. I will divide 
my presentation into two parts: 1) Catholic teaching before the papal 
allocution of Pius XII to physicians and anesthetists on Nov. 24, 1957 ; 
and 2) the papal allocution itself and responses of Catholic theologians 
to it. I will close with a discussion of some of the more pertinent 
issues as I see them. 
Catholic Teaching Before the Papal Allocution 
In an article published in 1958 1 (but written before the papal allo-
cution), Jose Janini presents a very concise history of the development 
of the concepts of the ordinary and extraordinary means for pre-
serving life , especially as these concepts are applied to surgical opera-
tions. He points out that in the 16th century, when the doctrine began 
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to be formed, the development of anesthesia and antisepsis was at 
such a primitive level as to render almost every surgical operation an 
excruciating ordeal both subjectively (pain) and objectively (disfigure-
ment) .2 In fact, surgical operations were not infrequently compared 
with torture chambers. 3 
It was in this context that Soto in 1582 first pointed out that 
superiors could oblige their subjects under religious obedience to use 
medicine that could be taken without too much difficulty (com-
mode), but that they could not oblige them to undergo excruciating 
pain because nobody is held to preserve life by such means. 4 It was 
Banez, however, in 1595, who introduced the terms "ordinary" and 
"extraordinary" into the discussion of the preservation of life. He 
points out that while it is reasonable to hold that a human being must 
conserve his or her life, one is not bound to employ extraordinary 
means, but only to preserve life by nourishment and clothing common 
to all, by medicine common to all, and even through some ordinary 
and common pain or anguish (dolorem), but not through any extra-
ordinary or horrible pain or anguish, nor by any undertakings 
(sumptos) extraordinarily disproportionate to one's state in life. 5 
Janini concludes his first section by pointing out that through the 
18th century the classical moralists held the following points: 
1. One has the obligation to undergo a surgical operation in order to 
protect one's life, when the pain or anguish (dolores) is negligible 
(exiguos), common, and ordinary. 
2. Nothing is demanded which would be the occasion for agonizing, 
horrible, or extraordinary pain or anguish . 
3. One is able to oblige by obedience, in spite of extraordinary pain, 
in some circumstances (he mentions three specific cases of this). 
4. Outside of those cases in which one can impose obedience, it is 
necessary to get the permission of the patient in order to operate, 
because one is one's own master when it comes to parts (mem-
brorum) of one's own body.6 
Janini begins his next section by pointing out that medical science 
of the 19th and 20th centuries, especially with its discoveries of anti-
sepsis and anesthesia, has profoundly altered the situation in which 
the classical moralists wrote . He then discusses the approaches of 
moralists during those years. 
In the first place, he points out that Palmieri leaves to others the 
task of deciding whether a surgical amputation is obligatory or not. 
Noldin concludes that it is, especially since there now exists the possi-
bility of attaching artificial limbs, and one has the obligation of pre-
serving life even with some bodily defect. Lehmkuhl expressly recog-
nizes that in his time a surgical operation, under the aspect of pain 
(dolor), cannot be considered as an extraordinary means . However, 
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Lehmkuhl makes a distinction between pain and horror, and maintains 
that one need not be bound to undergo an operation that one views 
with a great deal of repulsion (horrorem magnum), even though there 
may not be any actual pain involved. 7 
Janini then presents the position of Pruemmer who maintains that 
any surgical operation which is extremely painful or burdensome, such 
as the amputation of both arms, should be considered an extra-
ordinary means. He also mentions Merkelbach who introduces a util-
itarian calculus. He concludes this section by mentioning the opinion 
of Bender that to undergo a surgical operation of sufficient gravity 
that it would be considered an extraordinary means by moralists is not 
strictly obligatory to save one's life or regain one's bodily health as 
long as one's own life does not carry with it a relevant familial or 
social concern. 8 
In the final section Janini concludes that in the light of present sur-
gical techniques, modern surgery must always be considered an ordi-
nary means, at least as this term was understood by the classical 
moralists. However, he maintains that one must always consider other 
relevant circumstances (e.g., horror, uncertainty of success, etc.) as 
well as other virtues that may be involved (piety, charity), before one 
can pass a moral judgment on any given case. 9 
A much more thorough history and analysis of the doctrine of 
ordinary and extraordinary means was also published in 1958 by 
Daniel A. Cronin (this work was also written before the papal allocu-
tion, however»)O Some of Cronin's more significant conclusions are 
the following: 
1. All are obliged to preserve their lives unless a moral impossibility 
would excuse (any means involving a moral impossibility are 
extraordinary means). 
2. There is a distinction between natural (those per se intended by 
nature) and artificial (those whereby man can supplement 
nature) means of conserving life. Both, however, can be ordinary 
means. 
3. "Ordinary means of conserving life" and "ordinary medical pro-
cedures" must be distinguished. What is an ordinary medical pro-
cedure may not be an ordinary means of conserving life in the 
theological sense. 
4. A relative norm suffices for determining ordinary and extra-
ordinary means. (There is no absolute norm.) 11 
Before presenting Cronin's definitions of ordinary and extraordi-
nary means and how these should be employed, it would be helpful to 
point out that Cronin includes in his analysis the original work of the 
American moralist Gerald Kelly, S.J. In an article in Theological 
Studies written in 1950,12 Kelly discusses the duty of using artificial 
means of preserving life and comes to the conclusion that "even ordi-
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nary artificial means are not obligatory when relatively useless. "13 In 
a later article, 14 he modifies this position by considering the concept 
of uselessness as indicative of extraordinary means. 15 
Cronin, following Kelly, gives the following definitions : 
Ordinary means of conserving life may be defined as those means com· 
monly used in given circumstances, which this individual in his present 
physical, psychologica l, and economic condition can reasonably employ 
with definite hope of proportionate benefit. 
Extraordinary means of conserving life may be defined as those means 
not commonly used in given circumstances, or those means in common use 
which this individual in his present physical , psychological, and economic 
condition cannot reasonably employ , or, if he can, will not give him definite 
hope of proportionate benefit. 16 
He then points out that while ordinary means as defined are always 
morally obligatory, extraordinary means are not per se but only per 
accidens, i.e., a particular individual may be bound in some exten-
uating circumstances (e.g. , for the common good) to employ such 
means. 17 
In closing this section I should like to present three final points. 
The first is mentioned by Joseph V. Sullivan18 and the last two by 
Gerald Kelly. Sullivan points out that ordinary and extraordinary 
means are relative also to the patient's physical condition. Thus, "a 
natural means of prolonging life is, per se, an ordinary means of pro-
longing life, yet per accidens, it may be extraordinary," and "an arti-
ficial means of prolonging life may be an ordinary means or an extra-
ordinary means relative to the physical condition of the patient." 19 
Kelly mentions two other aspects worthy of note. First, he intro-
duces the principle of totality into the discussion and maintains that 
perhaps we should consider the patient's total condition before we 
decide whether a given means is ordinary or extraordinary. Thus, for 
example, he sees the possibility of a diabetic with terminal cancer not 
taking insulin as perhaps an extraordinary means.20 He also empha-
sizes that we must consider the rights and duties of relatives and 
physicians when evaluating whether a given means of conserving life is 
ordinary or extraordinary. This idea, presented in rudimentary form 
by Kelly, 21 is clearly explicated by Pope Pius XII as we shall soon see. 
The Allocution of Pope Pius XII to Physicians and Anesthesiologists 
and the Response of Catholic Moral Theologians 
On Nov. 24, 1957, addressing an international congress of physi-
cians and anesthesiologists, Pius XII explicated the papal magisterial 
teaching with regard to the prolongation of life. Following Huftier, 22 
the teaching can be broken down into the principle and its 
application. 
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Principle: 
Natural reason and Christian morals say that man (and whoever is 
entrusted with taking care of his fellowman) has the right and the duty in 
case of serious illness to take the necessary treatment for the preservation of 
life and health . This duty that one has toward himself, toward God, toward 
the human community, and in most cases toward certain determined per· 
sons, derives from well-ordered charity, from submission to the Creator, 
from social justice and even from strict justice, as well as from devotion 
toward one's family. 
But normally one is held to use only ordinary means - according to the 
circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture - that is to say, means 
that do not involve any grave burden (aucune charge extraordinaire) for 
oneself or another. A more strict obligation would be too burdensome (trop 
lourde) for most men and would render the attainment of the higher, more 
important good too difficult. Life, health, all temporal activities are in fact 
subordinated to spiritual ends. On the other hand, one is not forbidden to 
take more than the strictly necessary steps to preserve life and health , as 
long as he does not fail in some more serious duty. " 
Application: 
The rights and duties of the doctor are correlative to those of the patient. 
The doctor, in fact , has no separate or independent right where the patient 
is concerned. In general he can take action only if the patient explicitly or 
implicitly, directly or indirectly, gives him permission. The technique of 
resuscitation which concerns us here does not contain anything immoral in 
itself. Therefore the patient , if he were capable of making a personal deci-
sion, could lawfully use it and, consequently, give the doctor permission to 
use it. On the other hand, since these forms of treatment go beyond the 
ordinary means to which one is bound, it cannot be held that there is an 
obligation to use them nor, consequently, that one is bound to give the 
doctor permission to use them. 
The rights and duties of the family depend in general upon the presumed 
will of the unconscious patient if he is of age and "sui juris. " Where the 
proper and independent duty of the family is concerned, they are usually 
bound only to the use of ordinary means. 
Consequently, if it appears that the attempt at resuscitation constitutes 
in reality such a burden (une telle charge) for the family that one cannot in 
all conscience impose it upon them, they can lawfully insist that the doctor 
should discontinue these attempts, and the doctor can lawfully comply. 
There is not involved here a case of the direct disposal of the life of the 
patient, nor of euthanasia in any way; this would never be licit. Even when 
it causes the arrest of circulation, the interruption of attempts at resuscita-
tion is never more than an indirect cause of the cessation of life, and one 
must apply in this case the principle of double effect and of "uoluntarium in 
causa. " 23 
One of the first theologians to respond to this teaching was Eugene 
Tesson. In a brief articles in Etudes,24 he outlines the papal teaching, 
emphasizes the importance this decree gives to families of an uncon-
scious patient, and concludes by showing the value of casuistry in 
determining what treatment should or should not be accorded in given 
situations and circumstances. In a much longer article by Michel 
Riquet in Cahiers Laennec, 25 the papal teaching and its implications 
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are thoroughly analyzed. The author especially emphasizes the impor-
tance of the principle of totality (extended to the psychological and 
spiritual dimensions of the whole person) and shows how this prin-
ciple can enter the calculus of determination of extraordinary and 
ordinary means. 26 He also shows the importance of consequences as 
implied by this doctrine, emphasizing that if one would consider 
oneself a grave burden to oneself or to others by undergoing a surgical 
or medical procedure, one would not be obliged to undergo it.27 He 
concludes by stressing the complexity of most medical-moral deci-
sions, and points out how many different factors have to be con-
sidered before a really informed and prudent judgment can be made in 
any given case. 28 
Marc Oraison discusses the papal decree in a different context, that 
of the allocation of scarce lifegiving resources, in an article written in 
1963. 29 He raises the question whether, in a hospital equipped with 
six artificial respiration units all being used - some by persons in deep 
coma - a person with polio who needed one of these machines to stay 
alive would have more of a right to its use than would someone in 
deep coma who was already using it. He maintains that the Pope 
would affirm that the person who has the greatest hope of survival is 
entitled to the machinery, and that there is no moral difference 
between not using extraordinary means in the first place and ceasing 
their use once treatment has begun. 30 
D. F. O'Callaghan, responding to a letter in the Irish Ecclesiastical 
Record,31 points out that it is much more difficult to differentiate 
between euthanasia and the cessation of extraordinary means than the 
papal teaching seems to indicate, at least for the ordinary Christian. 
Thus the problem of scandal must be dealt with. The author feels that 
the best way to do this is to have public policy guidelines such as have 
been issued in some homes for the incurably ill.32 In general, this 
article is much more conservative in tone than any other considered 
thus far. 
In the journal Ami du Clerge, M. Huftier discusses the papal teach-
ing in two different articles.33 The latter article deals with the whole 
papal allocution and merely paraphrases and explains it. The first 
article, however, deals specifically with the ordinary and extraordinary 
means of preserving life and the author uses the papal document to 
support his own view. He contends that extraordinary means may be 
understood thus: A significant mutilation (whose significance comes 
from the extent or the function of the organ removed), or a serious 
surgical operation involving great expense or some danger, or some 
treatment demanding the use of a battery of complex techniques or 
the maintenance of extensive care. 34 He concludes the article by 
emphasizing that two points must not be forgotten: 
1. If someone doesn't have exact foreknowledge with mathematical 
certainty what will be the outcome, he should allow an ex per-
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ienced doctor to make the judgment. The doctor will at least 
have the technical expertise needed to make such a jUdgment. 
2. It is not forbidden to do more than that which is strictly neces-
sary to conserve life and health, as long as one does not fail in 
some more serious duty. 35 
Aidan M. Carr discusses the topic in response to a question in the 
November, 1973 issue of the Homiletic and Pastoral Review. 36 While 
he does not directly quote the papal teaching, he uses the very words 
of the Pope in formulating his reply. He also includes a very inter-
esting analysis provided him by the Catholic moralist Thomas J. 
O'Donnell. With regard to the prolongation of life in terminal illness, 
O'Donnell states: 
1. First, there is the means in itself - the extraordinary sophistication of 
the means, the cost in money, in pain, in emotional stress, etc., in 
using them. 
2. Second, there is the idea of therapy as something that cures or at least 
relieves. When a procedure ceases to do this, it ceases to be therapy. 
3. Third, and particularly in view of the advances in modern techniques, 
there's the impossibility of putting "extraordinary means" on one 
shelf and "ordinary" on another. Rather, it seems to me, we must 
speak of relatively ordinary or relatively extraordinary , i.e., relative to 
what is left of the usable context of human living for this patient; rela-
tive to what the specific means in question can accomplish; relative to 
the attitude and condition of the particular patient. 37 
A final reference should be made to the very thorough treatment of 
the issue found in Charles J. McFadden's sixth edition of his book, 
Medical Ethics. 38 (This approach is presented substantially unchanged 
in the author's latest book, The Dignity of Life. 39) While the author 
does not directly include the papal teaching in either book, his pres-
entation is consonant with it, and its significance lies in the fact that 
it provides clear-cut examples for almost every type of situation which 
can be conceived in the light of the traditional teaching. He also makes 
reference to other articles on the subject which have not been 
included here. 
Discussion 
As was mentioned earlier, the Karen Quinlan case has stimulated a 
renewed discussion of the issue of ordinary versus extraordinary 
means of preserving life. It has been my intention in this paper to 
show the evolution of this teaching in Catholic moral theology up to 
early 1974 when the Quinlan case began to exert its -influence upon 
ethicists and theologians of the present time. In this final section, I 
would like to raise some points of discussion based upon the presenta-
tion in the previous two sections. 
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In the first place, it was pointed out that Cronin makes a distinction 
between natural and artificial means and shows that both can be con-
sidered ordinary in some circumstances. Sullivan then claims that even 
natural means can be considered extraordinary since means are always 
to be considered relative to a patient's physical condition. This seems 
to indicate that providing adequate nutrition and protection from 
infection need not be absolutely necessary if the patient's physical 
condition doesn't warrant it. I believe that even the papal teaching is 
ambiguous on this point, for while it stresses on the one hand that one 
must always take the necessary measures to preserve life and health 
(indicating that natural means are always considered ordinary), it also 
states that one is not obliged to make oneself a burden to oneself or to 
others (indicating a much greater relativity of determining means). 
Secondly, it would seem that neither the European theologians nor 
the Pope himself adopt Kelly's utilitarian proviso that means used 
"without reasonable hope of success" are to be considered extra-
ordinary. This pragmatic approach, while not contradicted by anyone, 
seems to be totally ignored by almost all the European authors, with 
the exception of Oraison, who does not explicitly state the principle 
but uses it implicitly in the case he presents, and feels that this 
approach is consonant with the papal teaching. American and Irish 
moralists, however, are comfortable with this approach both before 
and after the papal teaching which would indicate that they feel that 
the Pope had not, in fact, rejected it. The question I would raise, tying 
this point to the previous one, is this: Could one ever in the case of 
terminal illness, even though someone were not a grave burden, dis-
continue feeding him because there was not a "reasonable hope of 
success" if he were fed normally? While most would consider this to 
be active euthanasia, it would seem possible to accept it within tradi-
tional Catholic thought, i.e., if natural means can sometimes be extra-
ordinary, and extraordinary means are determined at times by 
usefulness, why not discontinue natural means if they are useless? 
The third and final point is that raised by O'Callaghan who pointed 
out that it is hard at times to distinguish between euthanasia and the 
withdrawal of extraordinary means. This is especially true today when 
many times passive euthanasia is defined as the withdrawal of exotic 
life support systems for a given patient. It seems that because of the 
emotional overtones connected with the word, Church leaders are 
afraid to admit that Catholic moral theology has always allowed 
"passive euthanasia" as it is defined today, and are thus unspportive of 
legislation allowing precisely this in certain parts of the United States 
at the present time. It would be helpful to reflect upon the teaching of 
Catholic moral theology in this regard before pastoral letters are 
written which confuse people as much as they direct and guide them. 
Hopefully this presentation has brought into clearer focus some of 
the issues involved in the means used for the prolonging of human life 
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today. While we must not become slaves to the past, we must under-
stand former approaches if we are to formulate teaching that is in 
harmony with our tradition, yet responsive to the needs and problems 
of our times. 
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ARE YOU AN ARTIST? 
The American Physicians' Art Association, an organization now in its 
43rd year, meets annually with the Southern Medical Association and 
presents its yearly exhibit. The AP AA has nearly 500 members across 
the country. 
In 1980 the SMA meets in San Antonio, Texas, from November 
16-19. 
All physicians who work in the fields of painting, sculpture, photog· 
raphy, graphic arts, design and creative crafts are encouraged to join the 
APAA to submit entries for the November exhibit. 
The annual exhibit is always of top rank quality with professional 
arranging and hanging of the art works. Qualified judges each year 
award prizes in the following categories: oil and acrylics (classical and 
modern), water color, sculpture, arts and crafts, photography and 
graphics. Each category has a first, second and third prize. In addition, 
special masters awards, honorable mention, and best of show are also 
given. There is consideration for advanced and beginning artists. 
Membership is open to all physicians. Southern Medical Association 
membership is not required. Those interested should write to : 
Milton S. Good, M.D. 
Treasurer, APAA 
610 Highland Avenue 
Elizabethtown, PA 17022 
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